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I. INTRODUCTION
When Harold Koh, as Legal Advisor to the U.S. Department of State,
recently gave an address on 21st-century international lawmaking, he spoke
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about using much more than treaties and executive agreements to achieve
policy goals.' He also gave several examples of "memorializing arrangements
or understandings that we have on paper without creating binding legal
agreements with all the consequences that entails."2 One example of a
nonlegally binding agreement, or "political commitment," is the Copenhagen
Accord. The Accord secured commitments on emissions reductions from 141
countries around the world. Pursuant to the Accord, the United States
voluntarily submitted its intention to reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions
by 17% in 2020.4 The executive branch, however, has not presented the
Copenhagen Accord to the Senate because it believes that political
commitments do not require advice and consent. Instead, the executive branch
submitted a letter directly to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change indicating that the United States "associates itself' with the
agreement.5
Several constitutional questions arise from this single example of an
international agreement. First, where is the authority for the President to
conclude this agreement, and was the executive branch required to demonstrate
such authority before "associating" the United States with the Accord? Second,
how can the executive branch, acting solely, effect a commitment to an
emissions reduction target? Would it not require congressional approval and
legislation? Finally, assuming the executive branch alone could not effect its
commitment, would international law require Congress to implement domestic
legislation? The ramifications of forming political commitments in lieu of
treaties have seldom been studied.6 Congress itself seems unclear about the
Harold Hongju Koh, Address: Twenty-First-Century International Lawmaking, 101 GEO.
L.J. ONLINE 1, 13 (2012) ("Twenty-first century international legal engagement is hardly limited
to these conventional tools of treaties and executive agreements and customary international law.
Much of what my office does is to help policy clients advance their interests outside this familiar
framework, oftentimes by fostering cooperation with various partners in innovative ways. This
can take the form of what I call 'diplomatic law talk,' involving fluid conversations on legal
norms.").
2 Id. at 13-14 (describing several examples, including a Memorandum of Understanding
with the Arab League, the Copenhagen Accord, and the 2010 Communiqu6 of the Washington
Nuclear Security Summit (NSS), which aims to improve nuclear security and reduce the threat of
nuclear terrorism).
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference of
the Parties on Its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009, 5, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11 /Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010) (including the Copenhagen Accord).
4 The emissions reduction target is based on the 2005 level. Letter from Todd Stem, U.S.
Special Envoy for Climate Change, to Yvo de Boer, Exec. Sec'y of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (Jan. 28, 2010), https://unfccc.int/files/
meetings/cop_15/copenhagen.accord/application/pdf/unitedstatescphaccordapp.1.pdf.
s Id.
6 The most comprehensive study of this phenomenon can be found in Duncan B. Hollis &
Joshua J. Newcomer, "Political" Commitments and the Constitution, 49 VA. J. INT'L L. 507, 513
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legality of such agreements and its own responsibilities, as evidenced by the
report on the Climate Change agreements.7 The report provides answers to
these fundamental questions, but raises broader questions about the
constitutional foundation of the Executive's practice of adopting political
commitments.
A brief response is that political commitments uch as the Copenhagen
Accord provide moral and political guidance on how a state should act.9 By
creating political commitments in lieu of treaties, the states do not intend for
the agreements to be legally binding or to create legally enforceable rights and
obligations. Agreements that are not intended to be legally binding will not
satisfy the test for determining whether they constitute treaties under
international law and will therefore not be governed by international law.10
Some political agreements specify whether the states intend for the agreement
to be nonlegally binding; others employ aspirational language considered too
nebulous to create legally enforceable obligations."
Without the auspices of international law to govern the terms of an
agreement, standard legal remedies will not apply for noncompliance.'2 A state
can, however, pursue political remedies as a consequence of breaching a
political commitment, provided that response does not violate international
law." The political remedy may be sufficient to sway compliance, suggesting
that political commitments may be as helpful as legally binding treaties in
(2009) (providing the first "sustained constitutional inquiry of the U.S. political commitments
practice").
7 See EMILY C. BARBOUR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41175, INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS
ON CLIMATE CHANGE: SELECTED LEGAL QUESTIONs 7-15 (2010), http://fpc.state.gov/documents/
organization/l42749.pdf (describing the differences between the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Copenhagen Accord).
8 See id. at 17-18.
9 Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 6, at 517. For further discussion on Hollis and
Newcomer's definition of a political commitment, see infra Part II.D.
10 International law is dependent upon nation-states' willingness to bind themselves to the
text of an agreement. See Oscar Schachter, Editorial Comment, The Twilight Existence of
Nonbinding International Agreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296, 296 (1977).
" Id. at 297. Hollis and Newcomer identify several agreements with accompanying
language: "The NATO-Russia Founding Act's preamble references its 'political commitments,'
while the preamble to the 1987 Stockholm Disarmament Declaration describes the agreement as
'politically binding."' Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 6, at 523-24.
12 Fritz Minch, Non-Binding Agreements, 29 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR AUSLANDISCHES
OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 1, 11 (1977) (arguing that legal reprisals can only
originate from the breach of a legal obligation).
13 Id. (discussing how a political action that does not violate international law would be
permissible even though a legal sanction would not be).
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anticipating the actions of other parties. Evidence, in fact, indicates they have
the same compliance rates.14
For the United States specifically, political remedies might be
preferable to legal ones, given that the United States can use any nonlegal
weapon in its arsenal, including economic sanctions, to retaliate for the breach
of an agreement." Without the need to resort to a world court or general
principles of international law to enforce a breach, the United States has the
freedom to pursue whichever form of an agreement it can adopt most
efficiently. In my view, the executive branch will increasingly rely upon
political commitments precisely because, for all intents and purposes, political
commitments can be used interchangeably with treaties and congressional-
executive agreements.'6 The executive branch can also operate clandestinely
because no congressional approval is required to give the agreements effect.
These two factors, taken together, will result in a dangerous usurpation of
power by the executive branch.
In the most thorough discussion of political commitments to date,
Duncan Hollis and Joshua Newcomer made the case for defining a
constitutional space for them within the purview of the executive branch, albeit
not with plenary jurisdiction.7 They argue that "the executive power to make
international political commitments is subject to legislative checks, even if
distinct from-and lesser than-those that operate in the treaty context." 8
Nonetheless, they leave unanswered the question of how Congress can insert
itself into the political commitment making process, considering that the
agreements can be forged without congressional knowledge.19
This Article poses a solution to that dilemma, which is to use existing
law to force the executive branch to report nonlegally binding international
agreements to Congress. Applying existing law to political commitments is an
important step in rebalancing the distribution of power in the government by
providing Congress with information about the nation's foreign affairs. Indeed,
the imbalance of information between the two branches is not a new problem.
14 See G6rardine Meishan Goh, Softly, Softly Catchee Monkey: Informalism and the Quiet
Development ofInternational Space Law, 87 NEB. L. REv. 725, 734-35 (2009) ("Treaty and non-
treaty agreements have historically enjoyed largely the same compliance rates.").
15 See Minch, supra note 12, at 11.
16 For discussion on this debate and its application to political commitments, see infra Part
III.B.
7 Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 6, at 571-72 (investigating which branch should exercise
the political commitment authority, provided it exists, and determining that congressional
involvement is best suited to instances when immediate action and secrecy are not necessary
factors).
18 Id. at 514.
19 Id. Hollis and Newcomer do, however, provide an excellent framework for when Congress
ought to act, focusing on questions of form, substance, organization, and autonomy. Id. at 527-
28.
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In the last century, the lack of executive accountability and responsibility in
concluding non-treaty agreements led to the creation of the Case-Zablocki Act
("Case Act"), which attempts to control the volume of executive agreements
and to retain some level of congressional participation.20 The Case Act arose
from Congress's desire to be made aware of international agreements that were
not concluded pursuant to the Treaty Clause.2 1 The law allows Congress to
monitor and oversee international agreements that are not concluded as treaties
by requiring the Secretary of State to transmit the text of any international
agreement to Congress within 60 days after the agreement has entered into
force.22
This Article begins by providing an overview of the many forms that
the United States uses to conclude international agreements-particularly
focusing on congressional involvement in each form. Although we can identify
a degradation in congressional participation over the last century in
international agreement making, its complete absence from the formation of
political commitments is particularly worrisome. Part III uses examples of
political commitments to highlight the domestic legal consequences of their
formation, illustrating how the lack of interbranch coordination is more than a
theoretical imbalance of power, and thereby making the case for congressional
notification. Finally, Part IV argues in favor of applying the terms of the Case
Act to political commitments to provide Congress with more oversight over
foreign affairs. Neither the text nor the history of the Case Act indicates that
political commitments should be immune from the requirements. The result
will be the creation of international agreements that are more democratic, more
transparent, and more incontrovertible.
II. CONGRESSIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT MAKING
The Treaty Clause has earned its critics.2 3 The required two-thirds
concurrence of the Senate enabled 35 Senators to hold up ratification of the
20 Case-Zablocki Act, Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 619 (1972) (codified as amended at 1
U.S.C. § 112b (2014)).
21 International Executive Agreements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. Policy &
Sci. Devs. of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 92nd Cong. 2 (1972) [hereinafter International
Executive Agreements Hearing]. "It is those agreements that you are so reluctant to share with
Congress which we think this legislation should make available to us." Id. at 16 (statement of
Rep. Clement J. Zablocki, Chairman, Subcomm. on Nat'l Sec. Policy & Sci. Devs.).
22 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) ("The Secretary of State shall transmit to the Congress the text of any
international agreement (including the text of any oral international agreement, which agreement
shall be reduced to writing), other than a treaty, to which the United States is a party as soon as
practicable after such agreement has entered into force with respect to the United States but in no
event later than sixty days thereafter.").
23 The Treaty Clause provides that the President "shall have power, by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur."
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Treaty of Versailles, a treaty endorsed by their 49 remaining peers.24 Human
rights treaties in particular have been held hostage, leading to the Senate's
popular nickname as the "graveyard of treaties."25 Perhaps as a result of the
complicated treaty approval process, various forms of international agreements
have emerged that provide the Executive with greater flexibility when
concluding agreements with foreign states.26 In fact, far more often than not,
the President creates agreements with foreign nations by sole executive action
or by permission from Congress.2 In an attempt to demystify the international
agreement making process in the United States and to address the confusion in
nomenclature, this Article will be specific about the types of agreements being
discussed. I have elected not to discuss the well documented and widely
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Its location within Article II of the United States Constitution
results in the designation "Article II treaty," which will be used throughout this Article in
contrast to the other forms of international agreements.
24 Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, 108 HARv. L. REv. 799,
861 (1995) (citing 59 CONG. REC. 4599 (1920) ("When war struck, the Senate's rejection of the
League of Nations became a symbol of isolationist irresponsibility.")). John Yoo, however,
claims that there has only been one other significant treaty defeat, namely President Bill
Clinton's Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty. John C. Yoo, Laws As Treaties?: The Constitutionality of
Congressional-Executive Agreements, 99 MICH. L. REv. 757, 758 (2001).
25 See Jean Galbraith, Prospective Advice and Consent, 37 YALE J. INT'L L. 247, 248 (2012);
see also The Graveyard of Good Treaties, NATION, Mar. 15, 1900, at 199 (discussing the history
of the phrase "graveyard of treaties").
26 One lucid explanation of challenges of Article II treaty ratification can be found in Oona
A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and Future of International Lawmaking in the
United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236, 1310 (2008). In particular, Hathaway uses the ideological
positions of the 67th Senator (versus the 51st) to demonstrate the polarized extremes of politics:
If we array the senators in the 109th Congress from most liberal to most
conservative according to a widely used measure of ideological position, we
see that in the 109th Congress the sixty-seventh senator was just over twice
as conservative as the fifty-first senator. In the reverse dimension, the sixty-
seventh senator was also just over twice as liberal as the fifty-first. In other
words, the supermajority requirement means treaties must gain the support of
senators that are twice as conservative or liberal as the so-called median voter
in the Senate.
Id. at 1310-11.
27 According to the Congressional Research Service, most international agreements are not
concluded pursuant to the procedure outlined in Article II. In the first 50 years after its founding,
the nation concluded two times as many treaties as other international agreements. CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., LIBRARY OF CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: THE
ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE 15 (Comm. Print 1993). From the period from the Second
World War to 1993, the executive branch presented Article II treaties in only about 10% of its
total international agreement making. Id. That percentage has likely decreased since the report
was created in 1993. Since May 2005 (a date chosen to represent an approximately 10-year
period from this Article's publication), for example, only 70 treaties have been presented to the
Senate for its advice and consent. See Congressional Documents, U.S. Gov'T PUB. OFF.,
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/browse/collection.action?collectionCode=CDOC (last visited Mar.
30, 2016).
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understood Article II treaty process in this section, in order to focus on the
other international agreements and their histories. I have also reordered the
typical classification of the four types of agreements. The agreement forms can
be understood by situating them in their historical context, but the legitimacy of
their authorization also provides a useful descriptive device. This section of the
Article discusses, in turn: 1) ex post congressional-executive agreements,
which receive explicit endorsement by two branches of the government; 2) sole
executive agreements, which have constitutional support, but do not require
congressional approval; 3) ex ante congressional-executive agreements, which
ostensibly have congressional permission; and 4) political commitments, which
have none of these elements.
A. Ex Post Congressional-Executive Agreements-Approval Requirement
ofBoth Houses of Congress
The first of the four types of agreements is the ex post congressional-
executive agreement, which the United States has long observed as an
alternative method of creating binding international agreements. The ex post
congressional-executive agreement involves participation of the House of
Representatives and requires only a majority of the Senate, rather than the
concurrence of "two thirds of the Senators present" required by the Treaty
Clause.2 8 Much like the creation of an Article II treaty, "ex post congressional-
executive agreements" are concluded by the President without any specific
constitutional or statutory authorization in advance of the negotiations. These
agreements become law after they pass through Congress as ordinary
legislation or joint resolutions and are signed by the President pursuant to the
Presentment Clause.29
Some scholarly debate remains as to whether congressional-executive
agreements are a class of agreements that can be substituted with Article II
treaties, or whether the treaty clause is exclusive to certain categories of
28 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. The history of the ex post agreement can be found in Bruce
Ackerman and David Golove's fascinating article, Is NAFTA Constitutional?, where the authors
trace the creation of the agreement form to the 1920s, culminating in actions during the New
Deal. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 24, at 827-28. The authors present the story of
President William Howard Taft hoping to win a tariff reduction with Canada. Taft had not been
authorized by Congress to make such an agreement, so he finessed the language to contain a
promise to coax Congress to enact statutes to authorize the deal upon his return. Id. Not all
scholars agree with Ackerman and Golove's historical account, however. See, e.g., Peter J. Spiro,
Treaties, Executive Agreements, and Constitutional Method, 79 TEx. L. REv. 961, 988 (2001)
(arguing that "treaties and non-treaty agreements emerged near-equivalents in two important
respects long before the alleged watershed of 1944-1946").
29 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. ("Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of
the United States.").
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agreements.30 After all, the argument goes, if agreements concluded outside the
purview of the Treaty Clause are perfectly valid, why is there a heightened
approval process for treaties?31 Nonetheless, the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States endorses the position that the
congressional-executive agreement can be used interchangeably with the treaty
form.32
It would be misguided to attribute the frequent employment of ex post
congressional-executive agreements solely to their ability to serve as an end run
around the cumbersome requirements in the Treaty Clause. One argument in
favor of relying on ex post congressional-executive agreements would be to
bypass the problem of non self-executing treaties.33 Under U.S. law, the advice
and consent of the Senate is not enough to create domestic obligations for
treaties; the treaty must be categorized as either self-executing or not.34 This
means the United States can be bound by the terms of a treaty internationally,
but the treaty cannot be enforced domestically until Congress has created
30 See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-
Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1221, 1226 (1995) (examining
the text, history, and structure of the Constitution and concluding that "the Article II treaty
making procedure is exclusive").
3 Michael D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. REv.
133, 194 (1998) ("[T]here must be a substantive component to treaties that is more threatening
(or, more precisely, militates for greater caution) than the substance of nontreaty agreements.").
Even Hathaway makes the case that certain types of agreements should remain "treaties" under
the Article II process because the subject for a congressional-executive agreement cannot exceed
"the bounds placed by the Constitution on congressional authority" enumerated in Article I.
Hathaway, supra note 26, at 1339.
32 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 303 cmt.
e. (AM. LAW INST. 1987) ("The prevailing view is that the Congressional-Executive agreement
can be used as an alternative to the treaty method in every instance. Which procedure should be
used is a political judgment, made in the first instance by the President, subject to the possibility
that the Senate might refuse to consider a joint resolution of Congress to approve an agreement,
insisting that the President submit the agreement as a treaty.").
33 Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 695, 695 (1995) ("At a general level, a self-executing treaty may be defined as a treaty that
may be enforced in the courts without prior legislation by Congress, and a non-self-executing
treaty, conversely, as a treaty that may not be enforced in the courts without prior legislative
'implementation."').
34 See id. at 702 (discussing the introduction of this distinction into U.S. jurisprudence in
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829): "The Court's holding in Foster ecognizes that the
general rule established by the Supremacy Clause, under which treaties are enforceable in the
courts without prior legislative action, is one that may be altered by the parties to the treaty
through the treaty itself. Treaties do not require legislative implementation in the United States
'by their nature,' but they may require legislative implementation through affirmative agreement
of the parties. If the parties to the treaty agreed that the rights and liabilities of the individuals
before the court were to be affected only through future lawmaking acts of the states parties-if
they 'stipulated for some future legislative act'-then the treaty does not 'operate of itself' and
accordingly cannot be enforced by the courts without prior legislation.").
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implementing legislation.35 As a result, many treaties effectively require not
only two-thirds of the Senators present to approve the terms, but also require
the House and Senate to pass implementing legislation-in effect giving the
House an opportunity to hold a properly ratified treaty hostage if it does not
approve of the terms. Ex post congressional-executive agreements require the
House to be involved during the approval process, and implementing
legislation can be created during the process by which the agreement is
approved. One can even persuasively argue that because congressional-
executive agreements involve the House of Representatives, they are more
democratic than agreements made pursuant to the Treaty Clause.36 An ex post
congressional-executive agreement has received the blessing of both branches
of Congress and the President. The result is a transparent, democratically
representative, reliable process that involves both houses of Congress and the
Executive.
B. Sole Executive Agreements-Creation Without Congressional
Involvement
Alternatively, the second type of agreement, the sole executive
agreement, allows the President o conclude an agreement without any formal
action by the House or the Senate, but rather pursuant to the President's own
constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief.37 Despite the fact that this
implicit authority provides the President with the ability to create binding law
without congressional participation, scholars and courts have long supported
35 This principle was most recently put into effect in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 503-
06 (2008) (holding that the Constitution does not require state courts to honor treaty obligations
without domestic legislation implementing the terms of the treaty). An International Court of
Justice opinion, Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States),
Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12 (Mar. 31), would have provided relief for petitioner Medellin to
file a habeas application challenging his conviction and sentence on the grounds that he has not
been informed of his rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Medellin, 552
U.S. at 503. The Court found that the Avena judgment created an international obligation that did
not become domestically binding law because none of the treaty sources created binding federal
law without the existence of implementing legislation, and no such legislation had been enacted.
Id. at 503-06.
36 See, e.g., Robert A. Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy 24 (Yale Inst. of Int'l Studies,
Working Paper No. 1949) ("Surely majority action by both Houses is more 'democratic."').
Hathaway notes that the Senate is even less representative of its constituency today than it was
during the founding, noting that "Senators representing only about eight percent of the country's
population can halt a treaty." Hathaway, supra note 26, at 1310.
37 Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggrandizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54
UCLA L. REV. 309, 369 (2006) (arguing that the constitutional designation of the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces enables the President to "make legally binding
decisions-such as the disposition of armed forces personnel-without the involvement of
Congress").
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it.3 8 Because of the constitutional restraints on the presidential authority to enter
into sole executive agreements, they did not account for a significant portion of
international agreements concluded by the United States until recently.39 The
reality of those limitations has been upended, in part on reliance upon a handful
of Supreme Court decisions, with claims of 15,000 sole executive agreements
in the past half-century.40
The limits of the Commander-in-Chief power to conclude international
agreements were widely tested throughout the 20th century. The extent to
which the President may conclude peacetime agreements under this power,
specifically, remains an open question. President James Monroe famously
submitted to the Senate an agreement with Great Britain to limit the number of
naval forces on the Great Lakes, inquiring at the time whether it was "such an
agreement as the Executive is competent o enter into by the powers vested in it
by the Constitution, or is such a one as requires the advice and consent of the
Senate, and in the latter case for its advice and consent, should it be
approved.'' Presumably, President Monroe wanted to add the Senate as a party
38 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED States §
303(4) (AM. LAW INST. 1987) ("[T]he President, on his own authority, may make an international
agreement dealing with any matter that falls within his independent powers under the
Constitution."); see also Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 229 (2d ed. 1996) ("The President can . .. make many [international] agreements
on his own authority, including, surely, those related to establishing and maintaining diplomatic
relations, agreements settling international claims, and military agreements within the
Presidential authority as Commander in Chief. There are doubtless many other 'sole' agreements
within the President's foreign affairs powers, but which they are is hardly agreed."). The
presumptive authority is not without debate, however. Michael Ramsey, for example, argues that
the Framers intended for the power to conclude executive agreements only to extend to minor
and temporary matters. See Ramsey, supra note 31, at 133. Regardless of the Constitutional
authority for these agreements, there is judicial authority and precedent for them, and they are
part of the international agreement framework. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). "The
Constitution provides precise procedures to govern the adoption of each source of law recognized
by the Clause. Significantly, none of these procedures permits the President-acting alone-to
adopt, amend, or repeal supreme federal law." Bradford R. Clark, Domesticating Sole Executive
Agreements, 93 VA. L. REV. 1573, 1575 (2007).
3 According to a study conducted in 1984, only seven percent of all international
agreements were solely based on enumerated powers of the President, and of that seven percent,
military agreements composed the majority. LOCH K. JOHNSON, THE MAKING OF INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS 12-18 (1984). Additionally, the study estimated that over 87% of the executive
agreements that have been concluded by the United States during the past several decades are
directly based upon and authorized by legislation enacted by Congress. Id. at 12.
40 Van Alstine cites to 15,000 sole executive agreements in the last 50 years. Van Alstine,
supra note 37, at 319. The fuller history of the Supreme Court doctrine can be found in Ramsey,
supra note 31, at 145.
41 Ackerman & Golove, supra note 24, at 816-17 (citing S. ExEc. Doc. No. 9, 52 Cong. 2d
Sess. (1892)).
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to remove any doubt the British government might have about the binding
character of the agreement.42 Ackerman and Golove remark that, whatever the
reason, the incident "suggests how narrowly early Presidents construed their
leeway under the Treaty Clause."43 Later Presidents would test the boundaries
of their Article II powers without Senate endorsement.
Despite their constitutional legitimacy, sole executive agreements are
less reliable than congressional-executive agreements. Just as a President may
issue an Executive Order that ignores or rescinds a previous Executive Order,
so can a subsequent President, through actions or statements, overturn an
antecedent sole executive agreement." Ackerman and Golove highlight
President Theodore Roosevelt's concern regarding an agreement o place Santo
Domingo under American receivership. The Senate rejected the treaty, but the
President put the agreement into effect anyway, citing his modus vivendi
authority to conclude international agreements.45 According to President
Theodore Roosevelt, the Constitution did not forbid him from temporarily
entering the agreement pending senate reconsideration, but "it was far
preferable that there should be action by Congress, so that we might be
proceeding under a treaty which was the law of the land and not merely by a
direction of the Chief Executive which would lapse when that particular
executive left office." 46 Sole executive agreements that do not receive
congressional endorsement hus face a question of permanence. Although the
agreement form stands on firm constitutional footing, it is not democratically
endorsed, and is therefore not as strong of a commitment as the congressional-
executive agreements.
C. Ex Ante Congressional-Executive Agreements-Prior Congressional
Authorization for Executive Action
The United States enters into the vast majority of international
agreements not as treaties, sole executive agreements, or ex post congressional-
42 James F. Barnett, International Agreements Without the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
15 YALE L.J. 63, 72 (1905).
43 Ackerman & Golove, supra note 24, at 816.
" Id. at 820 n.70 (describing the literature pertaining to arguments for and against the
President's sole ability to make binding obligations).
45 The Commander-in-Chief authority is just one of several categories under which
Presidents claim to have the authority to conclude international agreements. Another substantial
category is referred to as "modus vivendi," which refers to agreements of a temporary nature that
are normally put into effect pending further action. Modus vivendi, BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
(10th ed. 2014). In the Santo Domingo instance, President Roosevelt declared that the agreement
was put into effective pending Senate reconsideration. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, ARTICLES
RELATING TO THE FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 360-61 (1905) (emphasis added).
46 Ackerman & Golove, supra note 24, at 819 (citing THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY 510 (1920)).
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executive agreements, but rather as ex ante congressional-executive
agreements. Despite the similarity in nomenclature with ex post
congressional-executive agreements, ex ante agreements share many
commonalities with sole executive agreements. First and foremost, their
legitimacy hinges upon preexisting authority to conclude an agreement. To
form an ex ante agreement, the President does not rely upon his own
presidential powers to conclude an agreement, but rather on statutory authority
bestowed upon him by Congress and signed into law by the President.48
The terms and specificity of statutory authorization will vary. In some
instances, the language authorizes someone in the executive branch (the
President may be named but others may be as well) to act in a very specific
manner. For example, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987
provided that "[t]he Secretary of Defense may authorize the Defense Mapping
Agency to exchange or furnish mapping, charting, and geodetic data, supplies
and services to a foreign country or international organization pursuant to an
agreement for the production or exchange of such data."4 9 While the actions
were specified in the authorization, the foreign countries and international
organizations were not, giving broad discretion to the executive branch to
determine with whom to conclude the agreements. The vast majority of
authorization acts do not require ex post approval, which means that not only
does the Executive have tremendous leeway when concluding an agreement,
but also Congress has no recourse if it disagrees with any of the agreement's
terms.50 Even more troubling is that the authorization acts often have no
47 The study of agreements concluded between 1946 and 1973 found that almost 87% of all
international agreements were executive agreements entered by the President under statutory
authority granted by Congress. JOHNSON, supra note 39, at 12. A second famous, but also dated,
study found that "the overwhelming proportion of international agreements are based at least
partly upon statutory authority (88.3% of agreements reached between 1946 and 1972), followed
by treaties (6.2%) and agreements based solely on executive authority and action (5.5%)." R.
ROGER MAJAK, 95TH CONG., INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: AN ANALYSIS OF EXECUTIVE
REGULATIONS AND PRACTICES 22 (Comm. Print 1977). These studies make no distinction
between ex ante and ex post statutory approval. But see Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power
over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 119 YALE L.J. 140, 150 n. 16 (2009) (finding that
only 9 of the 3,000 executive agreements concluded between 1980 and 2000 were ex post
congressional-executive agreements).
48 Normally, authorization acts that the President signs into law do not expire, meaning they
provide authority for any subsequent President, not just the one signing the bill into law, to enter
into an ex ante agreement. In fact, authorization acts have been used to provide a basis for
international agreements decades after they were signed into law. See Hathaway, supra note 47,
at 214.
49 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-569, § 601(a), 100
Stat. 3190, 3202 (1986) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 454 (2011)).
50 Hathaway, supra note 47, at 167 ("And if Congress were to object to an agreement, it
would have no recourse short of a majority vote in each house, subject to veto by the President,
to undo an international commitment made using its delegated authority. Even then, Congress
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expiration to them, meaning that a President today might conclude an
agreement pursuant to authorization that was granted decades earlier, in a
completely different political reality and climate.5'
Benefits of the ex ante congressional-executive agreement are plain to
see. These agreements rely not solely upon the constitutional authority of the
President, but rather upon interbranch coordination with Congress.52 Having
gone through both houses and the President, ex ante congressional-executive
agreements have the status of domestic legislation, which means they provide
greater legitimacy to foreign states.53 When the Constitution does not empower
a President to make agreements that bind the nation, advance congressional
authority provides flexibility during negotiations and a guarantee to the foreign
state that the commitment will be honored.54 Indeed, a foreign state is certain to
prefer ex ante congressional-executive agreements as they are more secure,
reliable and faster to create.
Of course, the appearance of congressional participation is misleading.
In reality, the lack of congressional involvement during the process, which
makes negotiating and concluding an agreement so much easier for the
Executive, shows how little interbranch coordination truly exists.55 The process
described above represents a dramatic change from the level of oversight that
Congress previously conducted with international agreements, which provided
"none of the broad, open-ended, time unlimited grants of authority from
Congress to the president that we find today."5 6
would only be able to render the agreement unenforceable under U.S. domestic law-the binding
international commitment would remain.").
5 Id. at 214 ("Many agreements today are concluded under broad ex ante authority granted
to the President by Congress four or five decades earlier in a vastly different context.").
52 To quote Justice Robert H. Jackson, "When the President acts pursuant to an express or
implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). In contrast, Justice Jackson argues
the President acts in the "twilight zone" when he relies on his sole authority and Congress is
silent. Id. at 636.
5 Similar to the argument espoused above, even a treaty that negotiators believe will be
ratified domestically still requires implementing legislation. Ex ante congressional-executive
agreements have greater domestic legal status than treaties, which provides for more reliable
commitments. See Hathaway, supra note 26, at 1316.
54 Ackerman and Golove detail an interesting story of the United States backing out of a
trade agreement with Brazil because it relied upon an executive agreement hat could not bind the
United States without the Senate's consent. See Ackerman & Golove, supra note 24, at 822-23.
5 As I referenced earlier, many of the agreements are concluded under broad authority
granted to the President. Hathaway furthers this point by stating that "[e]ven though the
agreements have been 'approved' by Congress in the narrow legal sense, there is little genuine
cooperation between the President and Congress in the process of creating the agreements."
Hathaway, supra note 47, at 214.
56 Id. at 173.
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The difficulty of tracking ex ante congressional-executive agreements
was no small matter to Congress because these agreements evaded the Senate's
exercise of advice and consent, which previously was how Congress had been
made aware of international agreements." The problem of secrecy led to the
creation of the Case-Zablocki Act in 1972.58 The Case Act requires the
Secretary of State to transmit the text of any international agreement to
Congress within 60 days after the agreement has entered into force.59
Agreements reported under the Case Act are public unless, in the opinion of the
President, their disclosure would be harmful to national security.60 The purpose
of the Case Act is not to wrest foreign affairs away from the President, but to
notify Congress of international agreements that are not concluded pursuant to
Article 11.61 Although the rationale for congressional delegation of international
agreement making may be strong, the difficulty of tracking ex ante
congressional-executive agreements, and their enabling statutes, make them
democratically problematic for Congress and the public at large.
D. Political Commitments-Agreements With No Congressional
Involvement
Political commitments provide yet another vehicle for the United States
to enter into agreements with foreign states.62 Hollis and Newcomer define a
5 E.g., Executive Agreements, 28 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 619, 619-21 (1972) (discussing the
Case Act and its purposes). The report references the increased use of executive agreements since
World War II and the shift in subject matter to include "issues formally considered important
enough to require Senate ratification by treaty." Id. The report specifically mentions military base
and joint defense agreements. Id. at 620.
5 See Case-Zablocki Act, Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 619 (1972) (codified as amended at 1
U.S.C. § I12b (2014)). See infra Part IV for more complete information surrounding the creation
of the Case Act.
59 1 U.S.C. § 112b(a).
60 Id.
61 S. REP. No. 92-591, at 3 (1972) ("The bill does not undertake to resolve fundamental
questions relating to the treaty power of the Senate and the frequently countervailing claim-or
simple use-of executive authority to enter into binding agreements with foreign countries
without the consent of Congress. S. 596 undertakes only to deal with the prior, simpler, but
nonetheless crucial question of secrecy.").
62 The nomenclature for this form of agreement has changed over time. The original
nomenclature "gentlemen's agreement" has fallen out of favor and the Restatement currently
uses the terminology "nonbinding agreements." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 301 cmt. e. (AM. LAW INST. 1987). I have taken the approach
adopted by Hollis and Newcomer in naming them political commitments because I believe the
term captures all of the forms of informal agreements, including de facto agreements, political
texts, extralegal agreements, nonlegal agreements, and international understandings. See Hollis &
Newcomer, supra note 6, at 516 n.30. Confusingly, the phrase is not endorsed unanimously. See,
e.g., Jean Galbraith & David Zaring, Soft Law as Foreign Relations Law, 99 CORNELL L. REv.
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political commitment as "a nonlegally binding agreement between two or more
nation-states in which the parties intend to establish commitments of an
exclusively political or moral nature." I adopt their definition not only for the
inquiry into whether the instrument provides a legally binding constraint, but
also for its focus on their "political or moral" nature, which provides a useful
mechanism to distinguish political commitments from other low-grade
international agreements, such as contracts for sales.
The Copenhagen Accord on Climate Change is a recent example of a
political commitment. During his speech on nonlegal understandings, Harold
Koh gave several other examples, including the "Arctic Council," which
emerged as a group of eight states to facilitate sustainable development and
cooperation in the Arctic." The use of political agreements has become
widespread, particularly since the 1970s. The content and form vary widely,
having "a significant impact on matters including security, arms control,
nuclear proliferation, monetary exchange, financial capital, sovereign debt,
trade, health, conservation, environmental preservation, pollution,
development, and human rights.'6 6 A political commitment might take the
shape of an oral agreement or a memorandum of understanding among mid-
level government officials. It might also be a formal document that shares all of
the characteristics of a treaty, except for a disclaimer stating that the compact is
politically, not legally, binding. As with ex ante congressional-executive
agreements and sole executive agreements, political commitments do not
735, 740 n.20 (2014) ("We have chosen to use the term 'soft law' to refer to nonbinding
transnational agreements between executive branch actors because the term is both convenient
and frequently used in this context."). However, "soft law" is also a term of art referring to
"international declarations, comments, interpretations, decisions, and pronouncements." David S.
Law & Mila Versteeg, The Declining Influence of the United States Constitution, 87 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 762, 834 (2012). I prefer "political commitment" because it captures the concept of an
agreement more than a unilateral pronouncement.
63 Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 6, at 517.
6 Koh, supra note 1, at 14 ("Again, the text is not legally binding, but it includes significant
undertakings, and states have already made significant progress in fulfilling their pledges and
improving nuclear security."). The Arctic Council is even more interesting as it is
layered on top of a legal backdrop of the Law of the Sea Convention, and the
customary international law it reflects, which answer important questions
about sovereign rights and jurisdiction in the Arctic. Now notice that the
Council is not a formal international organization; it was not set up by an
international agreement, and the majority of its work is not legally binding.
Id.
65 Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 6, at 565. The authors list an array of political
commitments after the Ford Administration including the Sinai Peace Accords, the Bonn
Declaration, the London Guidelines on Nuclear Exports and Chemical Trade, the Algiers
Accords, commitments to reflag Kuwaiti oil tankers, the 1992 Charter for Partnership and
Friendship with the new Russian Federation, the Rio Declaration, and the G8 Declaration on
Climate Change. Id. at 565-66.
66 Id. at 529.
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require post-hoc congressional approval, which offers the executive branch a
great deal of flexibility in negotiations. A political commitment also provides
the executive branch with the ability to terminate the agreement unilaterally or
to deviate from it without legal consequences.6 8
For the United States, the most important feature of a political
commitment may be its interchangeability with treaties in terms of
enforcement.69 Although a legal remedy will not be available in cases of
breach, states nonetheless will often pass on the opportunity to pursue a legal
remedy when one is available, opting instead to employ other tools. Thus far,
the repercussions for Russia's 2014 actions in Crimea, for example, have been
economic rather than legal.7 0 The United States, working with the European
Union, decided to pursue waves upon waves of economic sanctions, targeting
the state's financial, energy, and arms sectors, which were controlled by
specific individuals in Russia.71 In terms of expediency and focus, the sanctions
provided the United States and the European Union with more control,
illustrating the ascendency of economic sanctions over legal remedies. A
political commitment therefore can accomplish the same U.S. foreign policy
objectives as a multilateral treaty or a congressional-executive agreement. A
political commitment, however, excludes Congress, whereas no other
agreement form will have effect without congressional approval. As a result,
too much power lies in the hands of one political branch.
67 Id. at 526. In addition to flexibility, the authors identify three other rationales for the
proliferation of political commitments in lieu of treaties and executive agreements: credibility,
confidentiality, and domestic law. In terms of credibility, they argue that political commitments
"communicate less strong or less intense expectations of future behavior than do treaties." Id.
Political commitments can be confidential and certainly have less public visibility than treaties.
They require no public debate or hearings, which can result in little public pressure to act. Id.
Finally, as reiterated throughout this Article, domestic law "controls treaty making but not the
formation of political commitments." Id.
68 The ability to withdraw from a fully ratified treaty is more complicated than from a
political commitment, although exit provisions in the text of a treaty are not uncommon. See
Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REv. 1579, 1588-89 (2005) (describing how
states can lawfully denounce treaties provided that they follow the specified conditions).
69 See Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 6, at 543 (arguing that international law may allow
the United States to claim a legal violation, but if the United States wants to respond to a breach,
it employs political responses).
70 This Article is hardly the first to imply that Russia's actions constituted an act of
aggression in violation of the U.N. Charter. See, e.g., Cynthia Barmore & Chris Miller, Dumping
Debt and Seizing Assets: Ukrainian Countermeasures for Russian Aggression, 67 STAN. L. REv.
ONLINE 67, 70 (2014); Scott Appleton, Fighting for a Better Future, 68 IBA GLOBAL INSIGHT 12
(June 6, 2014), http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=5dl3ab36-1f50-4885-
89f4-e53d95379648.
71 Kate Beioley, Russia: Look the Other Way, LAWYER, Nov. 24, 2014, at 1.
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III. THE DOMESTIC LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL COMMITMENTS
To prevent this imbalance of power within the political branches, the
Case Act should be applied to political commitments as it is applied to other
forms of international agreements, thereby providing Congress with more
oversight over foreign affairs. As described above, the executive branch
unilaterally concludes political commitments. There is no explicit constitutional
permission for the creation of political commitments, although the authors
Hollis and Newcomer have done an admirable job of explaining why the power
should not be a plenary executive one.72 Until we agree upon a framework to
understand what the President can conclude as a political commitment, no
subject matter is off the table. These commitments have the potential to be
contentious, unpopular, and even illegal. This part of the Article will illustrate
how political commitments affect domestic law in order to demonstrate why
congressional oversight is an important complement to the executive branch's
international agreement making.
A. SALT II and Political Commitments' Conflicts with the Treaty Clause
Some believe that political commitments function as "treaties in
disguise" and should trigger the treaty making process. Political commitments
have certainly been used as a vehicle to bypass the restrictive Advice and
Consent provisions of the Treaty Clause. The clearest example of such an end
run was the SALT II Treaty, which arose from two rounds of negotiations
between the United States and the Soviet Union beginning in 1972.74 The
purpose of the SALT II Treaty was to complete the limitations on strategic
offense systems that began with SALT I, the first fully ratified treaty that
resulted from the negotiations. On June 18, 1979, President Jimmy Carter and
Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev reached an agreement to limit
strategic launchers, an agreement that was formally submitted to the Senate for
advice and consent four days later.76
72 Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 6, at 556-58 (finding multiple forms of international
agreement making in the text of the Constitution and describing the legislative role in each of the
agreement forms).
7 Id. at 538 (describing the domestic debates over the U.S.-Iraqi Declaration of Principles,
which may have influenced the executive branch's decisions to conclude the agreement not as a
political commitment, but instead as a treaty).
74 THOMAS GRAHAM, JR., DISARMAMENT SKETCHES: THREE DECADES OF ARMS CONTROL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (2d ed. 2012). SALT II is the common acronym for the second round of
the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.
7 Id. The purposes of SALT II are outside the scope of the Article but can be found in many
publications. See, e.g., id. at 50-102.
76 Id. at 93.
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As with all international agreements, the domestic political climate
greatly influences how arrangements are negotiated and whether they will be
ratified. The SALT II Treaty faced ratification problems for many reasons,
including the Carter Administration's prior difficulty with the Panama Canal
treaties, which provided "ample reason for the administration to expect a rough
reception for any SALT treaty, which, by its nature, will entail far more
complex and controversial issues than those which arose over the canal."n The
SALT II ratification process took place during a presidential election season, a
time we would expect Congressmernbers to be less willing to take controversial
stands. Negotiations with the Soviets at that time were certainly controversial
because of external Soviet actions during the previous decade. There was "a
venting of generalized anger at the Soviets for the intervention in Angola and
Ethiopia a few years before and for their efforts to exploit the more recent,
more spectacular American setback in Iran."7 8 Many wanted to see SALT II
fail, not because the Soviets had more to lose than the United States, but from a
desire to punish them for their actions throughout the globe.79 Additional
obstacles emerged after the introduction of the SALT II Treaty to the
Committee on Foreign Relations. In September 1979, the United States
discovered that a Soviet combat brigade was stationed in Cuba.80 The brigade
situation resulted in the delay of hearings and the Foreign Relations
Committee's report, which was originally scheduled to be filed by September
25, 1979." The delay proved critical for the Carter Administration, as the
Soviet military would expand its presence in Afghanistan in November 1979.82
Nonetheless, Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd pressed on, believing that
n Maxwell D. Taylor, What if SALT II Fails?, 2 AEI DEF. REv. 15, 15 (1978). "First, our
negotiators should never initial a draft treaty in Geneva that does not have a high probability of
Senate approval." Id. at 16.
78 STROBE TALBOTT, ENDGAME: THE INSIDE STORY OF SALT II 283 (1980).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 284-85 ("After having assured the Senate that Soviet military personnel in Cuba
were not there in a combat role, the administration belatedly discovered that some 2,600 Soviet
troops in Cuba (approximately one third of the total Soviet contingent there) had in fact been
organized into a combat brigade for a number of years; their mission involved maneuvers on
their own rather than the training of Cubans."); see also DAN CALDWELL, THE DYNAMICS OF
DOMESTIC POLITICS AND ARMS CONTROL: THE SALT II TREATY RATIFICATION DEBATE 167
(1991) ("Opponents of the SALT II Treaty asked, 'If the United States cannot even keep track of
a few thousand Soviet soldiers, how can it possibly keep track of thousands of Soviet
missiles?"').
81 CALDWELL, supra note 80, at 168.
82 TALBOTT, supra note 78, at 288. Talbott does note that as dramatic as the invasion and
subsequent retaliation appeared, the crisis had "been building for a long time." Id.
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the United States Senate would not vote down a major treaty even after the
beginning of the Iranian military hostage crisis.83
President Carter, in light of these developments, disagreed with Senator
Byrd's assessment and sent a letter to the Majority Leader requesting that
SALT II not be considered by the Senate.84 Neither President Carter, nor the
subsequent President, Ronald Reagan, formally requested that the Senate return
the treaty, which would also have required a majority of the Senate.85 Instead
the first step was taken towards agreeing with the Soviets
informally to observe SALT-it was proposed by President
Reagan in a statement in the spring and agreed to by Haig and
Andrei Gromyko in the fall-and to begin to reconstitute the
SALT negotiations, renamed START, in early 1982.
83 "The United States Senate in the twentieth century had never voted down a major treaty
that the president wanted (and didn't until 1999), if forced to vote; the tactic always used by
those opposed to a treaty was to prevent a vote." GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 98. "The Senate did
not like to be seen as formally rejecting a major foreign policy initiative." Id. Graham argues that
Senator Samuel Nunn, then uncommitted, could have been persuaded to announce his support for
SALT II, which likely would have resulted in the treaty being ratified. Id. at 98-99. The only
major treaty to have been rejected by the Senate at that time was the Treaty of Versailles. Yoo,
supra note 24, at 758.
84 Letter from President Carter to Senator Byrd, Senate Majority Leader, Requesting a Delay
in Senate Consideration of the Treaty (Jan. 3, 1980), in 16 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 12 (Jan. 7,
1980). President Carter wrote as follows:
In light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, I request that you delay
consideration of the SALT II Treaty on the Senate Floor. The purpose of this
request is not to withdraw the Treaty from consideration, but to defer the
debate so that the Congress and I as President can assess Soviet actions and
intentions, and devote our primary attention to the legislative and other
measures required to respond to this crisis. As you know, I continue to share
your view that the SALT II Treaty is in the national security interest of the
United States and the entire world, and that it should be taken up by the
Senate as soon as these more urgent issues have been addressed. Sincerely,
Jimmy Carter.
Id.
85 GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 102. The treaty was not formally returned until 2000, when a
Senate resolution directed the return of 19 treaties to the President. S. Res. 267, 106th Cong.
(2000).
86 GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 103. "I hastily said, 'what I meant was the United States would
have been obligated to do this if SALT II had entered into force."' Id. at 105; see also JERALD A.
COMBS, THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM 1895, at 389 (2012) ("Reagan held all
arms control negotiations in limbo for the first sixteen months of his administration, but he
promised to abide informally by the 'fatally flawed' SALT II Treaty so long as the Soviets did
likewise.").
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In other words, the treaty was neither approved nor withdrawn from
Senate consideration, effectually stopping the Senate from making a decision.
The terms of the agreement, however, were honored by both the Soviet Union
and the United States until 1986 when the Reagan Administration withdrew
from SALT 1.'
This episode helps identify several problems with political
commitments. First, the actions render the Treaty Clause, with its heightened
approval process, moot. The Senate stands to have meager influence in the
treaty making process when the President can strip it of its opportunity to
provide or deny Consent. If a substantive agreement such as SALT II can be
concluded and followed with no congressional approval at all, the executive
branch's incentive to include Congress in its agreement making process will be
reduced.
Secondly, President Carter's actions stand in stark contrast o President
Roosevelt's actions after his Santo Domingo defeat.8 9 Roosevelt's fears of a
subsequent President invalidating a political commitment came true in the
SALT II context when President Reagan unilaterally withdrew from the
agreement only a few years later. The Executive has the ability to place a
subsequent administration in a precarious position by instituting nonlegally
binding obligations that can have disastrous consequences if abandoned. A
nuclear disarmament reaty that could not be ratified by the Senate stands as the
preeminent example of an agreement that is unlikely to be honored once the
President who made the commitment leaves office.
Finally, a political commitment has the potential to violate domestic
law. The SALT II agreement appears to contravene the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act, which provides:
No action shall be taken pursuant to this chapter or any other
Act that would obligate the United States to reduce or limit the
Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a militarily
significant manner, except pursuant to the treaty-making power
of the President set forth in Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of
the Constitution or unless authorized by the enactment of
87 There are some references to President Carter withdrawing the treaty. See, e.g., AMY F.
WOOLF ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33865, ARMS CONTROL AND NONPROLIFERATION: A
CATALOG OF TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS 5-6 (2016), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL33865.pdf
(describing that SALT II was completed in June 1979 but withdrawn by President Carter from
Senate consideration when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979). But it is
important to note that it would have required a majority vote of the Senate to return the treaty,
which did not occur until 2000. See S. Res. 267, 106th Cong. (2000).
8 GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 100.
89 For discussion, see supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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further affirmative legislation by the Congress of the United
States.90
This act, signed into law by President John F. Kennedy, runs counter to
the notion that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, might have been
lawfully able to make a commitment with the Soviet Union not to test or use
certain weapons. Even a sole executive agreement cannot have domestic legal
effect if it is contrary to federal law.91 The legality of SALT II likely evaded
inquiry because the agreement was never formalized.
B. Political Commitments and the Interchangeability Debate
Another potential problem with political commitments lies in their
interchangeability with executive agreements. The relationship between treaties
and executive agreements has been debated for decades, with some believing
that treaties and executive agreements can be substituted for one another in all
cases and others believing there are classes of agreements that must be
concluded pursuant to the Treaty Clause.92 Language found in the Department
of State's internal guidelines gives credence to the idea that some agreements
must be concluded as treaties, but there is little guidance for determining the
type(s) of agreement o which that principle applies.93 The most comprehensive
90 Arms Control and Disarmament Act § 303, 22 U.S.C. § 2573 (2014). Note that the
language of the Act clearly contemplates ex ante congressional-executive agreements, which
seem properly suited to arms control agreements:
No action shall be taken ... that would obligate the United States to reduce
or limit the Armed Forces or armaments of the United States in a militarily
significant manner, except pursuant to the treaty-making power of the
President ... or unless authorized by the enactment of further affirmative
legislation by the Congress of the United States.
Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, Caldwell writes that "[p]artially because of the difficulty of
obtaining a two-thirds vote of approval from the Senate, President Carter and his advisers
considered concluding SALT II as an executive agreement rather than a treaty." CALDWELL,
supra note 80, at 194 (citing a phone interview with President Carter). History would have shown
this to be a valuable avenue for the President and his advisors as it might have resulted in
approval of the agreement.
91 Hathaway, supra note 47, at 213 (arguing that sole executive agreements cannot have
domestic legal effect if they are contrary to federal law concluded pursuant o Congress and
executive action). This Article does not seek to place political commitments into one of the zones
of authority that call to mind Justice Jackson's infamous concurrence in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), which articulated the extent to which the Executive
had control over foreign affairs. Id. at 635-38. Instead, I highlight an instance in which Congress
and the Executive worked together to pass a law that minimized sole executive power.
92 For a concise overview of the debate, see Hathaway, supra note 26, at 1244-48.
9 Circular 175 Procedure, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s//treaty/cl75/ (last
visited Apr. 19, 2016) [hereinafter Circular 175] (codified at 22 C.F.R. § 181.4 (2015)). The
criteria are discussed at further length infra Part IV.B.
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and persuasive account of the international agreement making process
demonstrates that the two forms (treaties and executive agreements) are neither
treated as "fully interchangeable nor used in ways that reflect relevant legal
differences."9 4 How and when agreements are concluded appears not to be
driven by substance and content but instead by politics: "[T]he decision to
pursue an agreement through one or the other of the two major international
lawmaking processes is driven principally by historical happenstance and
political considerations."95 So too is the case with political commitments.
Repatriation agreements provide a lucid example of the
interchangeability between political commitments and congressional-executive
agreements. They also offer some insight into how political commitments can
affect legal rights and obligations in U.S. courts. In 2001, the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the release of Kim Ho Ma, a man born in Cambodia in 1977. In light
of a conviction of aggravated felony, Ma had been ordered removed from the
United States.97 However, the district court had found that there was no
"realistic chance that [he] be deported" because of the absence of a repatriation
treaty between the United States and Cambodia.9 8 The Supreme Court
remanded in Zadvydas v. Davis, requiring the Ninth Circuit to look not only at
whether there was an expatriation agreement in place at the time but also at the
likelihood of successful future negotiations.9 9
Afterwards, the United States and Royal Government of Cambodia
concluded a Memorandum to "act in spirit of mutual cooperation in
determining the nationality of an individual and in all matters pertaining to
repatriation."'00 It continues: "The United States and Cambodia are committed
to the primary objective of effecting the return of each other's nationals to their
home State, taking into account the humanitarian and compassionate aspects of
94 Hathaway, supra note 26, at 1271 (using an empirical analysis of congressional-executive
agreements to trace their authorizations and approvals in comparison to treaties).
95 Id. at 1249.
96 Ma v. Reno, 208 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2000), vacated sub nom., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S.
678 (2001), modified and reinstated sub nom., Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2001).
97 Id. at 818.
98 Phan v. Reno, 56 F. Supp. 2d 1149, 1156 (W.D. Wash. 1999). In Ma, the Ninth Circuit
wrote, "There are also many aliens from Laos and Vietnam who cannot be removed because our
government has no repatriation agreement with those countries." Ma, 208 F.3d at 818 n. 1.
9 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 681 (2001).
100 Memorandum Between the Government of the United States and the Royal Government
of Cambodia for the Establishment and Operation of a United States-Cambodia Joint
Commission on Repatriation, Cambodia-U.S., Apr. 27, 2000, http://www.searac.org/sites/default/
files/Cambodia%20and%20US%20MOU.pdf. The Author notes the unreliability of the website,
but cites to it as an example of how these texts either cannot be found, or are located on
unreliable hosts. It is possible that legal consequences can arise from such political commitments
that are neither public nor subject to any standardized rulemaking.
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each case and the principles of internationally recognized human rights."'
Should there be any questions as to the legal status of this instrument, it
specifies, "Nothing in the document imposes, or should be constructed to
impose, any legal or financial obligations on either State."1 0 2 This
Memorandum of Understanding would have satisfied the preliminary standard
set forth in Zadvydas by enabling immigration officials to proceed with
removal proceedings until the six-month period and possibly further.
Regardless of its nonlegal status, the political commitment effectively
diminishes the plaintiffs legal rights by unilaterally allowing the executive
branch (in this case, a defendant) to conclude an agreement hat it can enter into
and exit from without any delay or debate.
The United States does not always conclude repatriation agreements by
political commitments. For example, in 2008, the United States entered into a
bilateral congressional-executive repatriation agreement with Vietnam.103 Exact
numbers for political commitments regarding repatriation are difficult to
locate-the political commitment with Cambodia evaded publication in the
Treaties and Other International Acts Series, and it does not appear on the now
defunct U.S. Department of State's website that listed international agreements
reported to Congress under the Case Act. However, it is clear that the formation
of repatriation agreements operates on parallel tracks: one track requires
congressional participation and the other excludes Congress entirely. The
decision to choose one over the other most likely mirrors Hathaway's findings
regarding treaties and congressional-executive agreements: political expediency
is the primary factor. More troubling is not whether an agreement involves a
supermajority of the Senate or a majority of both houses, but rather whether an
agreement involves Congress at all.
101 Id. at 1.
102 Id.
103 Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government
of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam on the Acceptance of the Return of Vietnamese Citizens,
U.S.-Viet., Jan. 22, 2008, T.I.A.S. No. 08-322, http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
108921.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). This agreement, unlike the political commitment
between the United States and Cambodia, contains a sunset date and specifies terms for exiting
early. Article 6, Entry into Force and Duration, provides:
1. This Agreement will enter into force sixty (60) days from the date of
signature by both Governments.
2. Upon entry into force, this Agreement will be valid for five years.
The Agreement will be extended automatically for terms of three years
thereafter unless written notice not to extend is given by one Government to
the other at least six months prior to the expiration date of the Agreement.
Id. at 5.
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C. The Problem ofExcluding Congress
Thus far I have discussed how Congressmembers are excluded from
the formation of a political commitment. Many Congressmembers, however,
might very well prefer an Executive that manages foreign affairs so they can
instead focus on issues more closely related to their constituents.104
Furthermore, the quantity, level of commitment, and presumably the
importance of the content in a political agreement might lead Congress to
prefer to remain uninvolved. This view ignores the realities of the impact of
international agreement making today on domestic policy and law, which can
no longer be separated into two spheres.'05 Moreover, for recalcitrant
Congressmembers who prefer to remain uninvolved, notification of political
commitments via the Case Act would not require them to act, but would
provide them with an opportunity they currently lack.
A natural objection to a notification requirement will be legitimate
concerns about national security, including exigent circumstances that require
swift and decisive action. Moreover, one can imagine classes of agreements
that would likely only be concluded under a blanket of secrecy, including status
of force agreements situating military personnel in foreign countries. It would
be disastrous and illogical for these agreements to be made publically available.
However, this does not automatically lead to the conclusion that only the
executive branch need be aware of these agreements. Currently, a legally
binding sole executive agreement must be reported under the Case Act, which
has provisions that account for the reality of secrecy in modern international
agreement making.'06 The provision allows for the President, unilaterally, to
identify agreements prejudicial to the national security of the United States.
Those agreements are not made publicly available or even reported to all
Congressmembers; instead they are transmitted to the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations and the House Committee on International Relations.07 By
using the Case Act to require the Executive to pass along agreements to
1'0 Hathaway, supra note 47, at 185 (detailing the evolution of the Executive's foreign power
and Congress's willingness to abdicate responsibility).
105 Id. at 218 ("Today the line between international and domestic law is increasingly
blurry.").
106 The full text provides that
any such agreement he immediate disclosure of which would, in the opinion
of the President, be prejudicial to the national security of the United States
shall not be transmitted to the Congress but that be transmitted to the
Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives under an appropriate
injunction of secrecy to be removed only upon due notice from the President.
1 U.S.C. § 112b(a) (2014).
107 Id.
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Congress, this Article does not pose onerous or problematic obligations,
because the system is already in place to mitigate security concerns.
More importantly, the secrecy objection frames the argument in terms
of the ability of the Executive to withhold information from Congress. The
proper inquiry is not into whether Congress has a right to learn of a political
commitment, but rather into what right the executive has to withhold it.t0 To
any extent an executive privilege exists, the Constitution is best read to favor
"shallow and politically checkable secrecy."109 The history of the past 50 years
is fraught with executive abuse, from Watergate to warrantless surveillance. 0
The response, after abuse has been identified, is often a push towards
transparency and open access to information."' This Article simply suggests
moving towards a notice requirement earlier rather than later.
Another potential objection might question how important
congressional involvement is at all, considering that political commitments
create no legally binding law or obligations. If implementing legislation were
required for a political commitment to have domestic effect, Congress will
clearly be provided with notice of the agreement. Assuming resources, such as
funding or personnel, would need to be shifted from another priority, Congress
has an opportunity to act in a meaningful way.1 2 While we might criticize the
executive branch for "associating" the United States with a contentious climate
change arrangement, Congress has the opportunity to refuse to pass any
implementing legislation, essentially nullifying the agreement.
However, not all agreements will require domestic legislation, and
although we can describe many agreements as having no legal effect, we
108 As Raoul Berger asked in 1965, what does the role of the President as Commander-in-
Chief add to his right to withhold information? See generally Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege
v. Congressional Inquiry, 12 UCLA L. REv. 1044 (1965).
109 Heidi Kitrosser, Secrecy and Separated Powers: Executive Privilege Revisited, 92 IOWA L.
REv. 489, 514-15 (2007) (using historical sources to argue the Constitution disfavors privilege
claims over Congress). For expansion on this theory, see David E. Pozen, Deep Secrecy, 62
STAN. L. REv. 257 (2010).
110 Pozen, supra note 109, at 259.
III The Case Act itself stems from frustration about executive secrecy. In fact, the rationale
used in the creation of the Case Act remains current today:
[The Case Act] does not undertake to resolve fundamental questions relating
to the treaty power of the Senate and the frequently countervailing claim or
simple use of executive authority to enter into binding agreements with
foreign countries without the consent of Congress. [It] undertakes only to
deal with the prior, simpler, but nonetheless crucial question of secrecy.
S. REP. No. 92-591, at 3 (1972). Pozen notes other laws that shifted away from presidential
secrecy in the 1970s, including the 1974 Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) amendments, Pub.
L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2014)), and Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-62 (2014)). Pozen, supra note 109, at 312.
112 Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 6, at 546.
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should question the importance of that distinction when the stakes of the
agreements themselves are so high. Hollis and Newcomer give the example of
an agreement between Vice President Al Gore and Russia's Prime Minister
Viktor Chemomyrdin, which effectively exempted Russia from U.S. sanctions
in return for a phase out of Russian arms sales to Iran. "Congress's hearings on
the topic featured executive insistence that the aide m6moire had no legal
effect, with skeptical Senators disputing how much the nonlegal nature of the
agreement mattered given the substance of the instrument itself."'13 Because, as
indicated earlier, sanctions are the preferred enforcement mechanism that the
United States uses to achieve its objectives, the legal effect argument is
rendered moot.
Finally, it is a mistake to view the limited options available to Congress
and conclude that it should have none. Congress does, in fact, have a few tools
for oversight. It can express disapproval with joint resolutions and work to
enact legislation to ensure U.S. performance or non-compliance.l14 In the case
of the Helsinki Accords,for example, Congress was successful in carrying out
vigorous oversight through the Commission on Security and Cooperation in
Europe."'5 Another tool is the pulpit: in 2002, Congress, through public
demands and complaints, pressured the Bush administration to present any new
nuclear arms reductions agreements with Russia to the Senate as a formal
treaty." 6 To exercise any of its options, Congress, at a minimum, must be made
aware of the commitments when they arise.
IV. APPLYING THE CASE ACT TO POLITICAL COMMITMENTS
I discussed two examples of political commitments supra: the first was
an Article II Treaty that did not receive Advice and Consent, the terms of
113 Id. at 568-69.
114 Id. at 567 (providing examples of congressional action, including the possibility of
curtailing the President's authority to comply with a North Korean political commitment on
denuclearization).
1s The human rights agreements that arose from the Helsinki Conference talks between the
United States and the Soviet Union are some of the most high profile political commitments and
were understood, at the time, to not be legally binding. In fact, the negotiations that created the
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe were said not to be eligible
for registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations, because it was not a
treaty. Schachter, supra note 10, at 296. Schachter claims there was no evidence that any
signatory states disagreed with the understanding that the Act did not entail a legally binding
commitment. Id. Nonetheless, Congress did establish a Commission to monitor compliance. See
Act of June 3, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-304, 90 Stat. 661 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§
3001-09 (2014)).
116 Thom Shanker, Senators Insist on Role in Nuclear Arms Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2002, at 16 ("At his Wednesday news conference, Mr. Bush said he agreed with Mr. Putin 'that
there needs to be a document that outlives both of us,' adding, 'And what form that comes in we
will discuss."').
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which were nonetheless honored; and the second was an agreement that is
effectively identical to an executive agreement, the text of which was never
published or reported.'17 These examples highlight the problem with modem
international agreement making: the Executive pursues and concludes
agreements in whichever way he deems most expedient. Congress operates
without input or knowledge of the decision making process because the
common understanding is that no domestic law governs the creation of or
compliance with political agreements. Neither Congress nor the Executive has
regarded political commitments as falling under the purview of the Treaty
Clause."8 And because the commitments are not legal instruments, their
formation is not governed by the language in the Presentment Clause."9
Consequently, very little attention has been paid to whether or how the
President can conclude political commitments.120 Unsurprisingly, no court has
determined that the Constitution regulates them. Instead courts treat them as
nonjusticiable political questions to be "redressed outside the courtroom."l2 1 Of
course, there is no opportunity to redress these issues because the Executive
operates under the impression that no law or practice obligates him to inform
Congress of the creation of a political commitment. The agreements are not
submitted to the Senate as Article II Treaties and they are not currently reported
117 One could make the argument that the United States had an obligation to honor the terms
of SALT II because it had signed the treaty. It is true that the United States has the obligation to
not defeat the purpose of the treaty, pending its ratification. This view comes from the Article 18
of the Vienna Convention which states, "A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty. . . until it shall have made its intention clear not to
become a party to the treaty." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties arts. 2(1)(b), 11-17,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). Note that although the
United States is not party to the Vienna Convention, the executive branch has made many
references to being bound to its provisions under customary international law. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (AM. LAW INST. 1987). Were
this argument accurate, it would place far too much power in the hands of the Executive. Mere
introduction of an agreement into the Senate would create binding status. See Curtis A. Bradley,
Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution, 48 HARV. INT'L L.J. 307, 3 15
(2007) ("If the United States is bound by international law not to defeat the object and purpose of
treaties that it has signed but not ratified, then the unilateral signature of the president or his agent
can bind the United States to certain international legal obligations."). As we have seen with
SALT II, introduction to the Senate does not imply a vote. Congressmembers and Senators who
were ambivalent or opposed to the ratification of the treaty are now bound without having the
opportunity for input or a vote.
118 Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 6, at 549.
119 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2, refers only to bills that become laws.
120 Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 6, at 512 ("The question of whether and how the United
States can enter into political commitments with other nations has received virtually no
attention.").
121 Id. at 555 n.203 (quoting Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370,
376 (7th Cir. 1985)); see also Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(holding political commitments not cognizable by U.S. courts).
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to Congress under the Case Act, leaving a large body of foreign policy and
agreement making to go unchecked and potentially unnoticed. As I have
demonstrated, this oversight can result in the Executive exceeding any
presumptive authority, potentially violating lawfully created domestic
legislation. This harm can be reversed by simply applying the Case Act to
political commitments.
A. History of the Case Act Permits Requiring Reporting ofPolitical
Commitments
The Case Act specifically uses the phrase "international agreement" to
capture a category of agreements other than treaties, which were already
submitted to the Senate for advice and consent.122 A cursory reading of the
Case Act would indicate that the Secretary of State must transmit to Congress
the text of any political commitment because the language of the Act provides
for "the text of any international agreement."1 23 An international agreement,
after all, is not a subset of a treaty. The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (VCLT) defines a treaty as "an international agreement concluded
between States in written form and governed by international law, whether
embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and
whatever its particular designation."1 24 A treaty is governed by international
law: the intention to be governed defines a treaty in contrast to other
international agreements.125 A political commitment is therefore one form of an
international agreement that can be differentiated from treaties by its non-
legally binding nature.
One could argue that the phrase "international agreement" had a more
specific meaning in the United States at the time of the legislation. The
Department of State, in its Circular 175, clearly classifies international
agreements other than treaties as agreements made by the Executive 1)
122 1 U.S.C. § 112b (2014).
123 § 112b(a).
124 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331
(entered into force Jan. 27, 1980).
125 The Travaux Pr6paratoires of the VCLT points to this understanding: "The present
Rapporteur, while agreeing with much that is contained in the first report of Lauterpacht, feels
that while it may be possible to have certain agreements between States that are not governed by
international law, it is not possible to have, or admit of, a case of a treaty (even using that term in
its widest sense) that would not be so governed. Hence, this should be explicitly stated. Not all
international agreements are governed by international law, but, if they are not, or to the extent
that they are not, they are not treaties within the meaning of the present Code." G.G. Fitzmaurice,
Report on the Law of Treaties to the International Law Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/101
(1956), reprinted in 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 104, 117, http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/
yearbooks/english/ilc 1956_v2.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2016). More investigation of the
Travaux can be found in Schachter, supra note 10, at 301 n.19.
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pursuant to existing legislation or treaties, 2) subject to congressional approval,
or 3) in accordance with the President's constitutional power.126 A review of
the legislative record, however, indicates that this understanding was neither
universal nor dispositive. In fact, the legislative record is peppered with
references to international agreements other than what the Executive might
classify as sole or congressional-executive agreements. During committee
hearings a State Department spokesman, Mr. John Stevenson, specifically
raised the question of what kind of arrangements would constitute international
agreements, indicating there would be types of international agreements that
did not warrant reporting within the meaning of the legislation. 127 Mr.
Stevenson might well have been inquiring about political commitments, but the
House Report write up reveals that the Congressmembers understood him to be
inquiring about trivialities such as "administrative working details for carrying
out a treaty or agreement" or agreements "in the nature of commercial contracts
relating to sales of equipment and commodities."128 Congress was looking to
avoid being "inundated with [such] trivia.,129 The record also reflects
repeatedly that no one voted with the understanding that some agreements
would be excepted. 30
Congressmembers were quite motivated to discover any international
agreement other than treaties. 3 1 "As the committee has discovered, there have
been numerous agreements contracted with foreign governments in recent
years, particularly agreements of a military nature, which remain wholly
unknown to Congress and to the people."'3  As one such example, Senator
Case quoted Henry Kissinger, "When I visited Pakistan in January 1962, I was
126 Circular 175, supra note 93.
127 H.R. REP. No. 92-1301, at cmt. 1 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3067, 3068
(statement of John Stevenson, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep't of State).
128 Id.
129 Id. This, of course, can be accomplished by creating a threshold standard, such as
"international significance," for an agreement to be passed on to Congress.
130 See International Executive Agreements Hearing, supra note 21, at 7 ("1 think the
obligation is complete. It is intended in my judgment to be a complete obligation.") (statement of
Sen. Case). See also the exchange between Congressman Zablocki and Senator Case:
MR. ZABLOCKI: Senator, for the purpose of legislative history, when
your bill passed the Senate by a vote of 81 to 0, did any of the Senators...
vote with the understanding that some xecutive agreements might be
exempted from the requirements of the bill by unilateral action of the
President?
SENATOR CASE: So far as I know, Mr. Chairman, nobody did.
Id. at 8.
131 See, e.g., id. at 16 (Mr. Zablocki: "I might very clearly say any agreement-that is any
agreement other than a treaty-is what we are interested in. Whatever treaties are published you
don't have to bother with, we will find them, we have access to them.").
132 H.R. REP. No. 92-1301.
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briefed on a secret document or oral understanding about contingencies arising
in other than the SEATO context. Perhaps it was a Presidential letter. This was
a special interpretation of the March 1959 bilateral agreement."'33 Senator Case
continued:
Whether in fact such a "special interpretation" existed which
could have directly involved the United States in the Indian-
Pakistan war, this is an example of how an annex of mere
"military" significance, although perhaps concluded in a time
of relative tranquility when its application seemed remote, can
have an overriding importance to this country's foreign
policy.13
4
The legislative history of the bill does not concern itself with "legally
binding" international agreements and makes only a differentiation between
treaties and other international agreements. Moreover, the concept of a non-
legally binding agreement was not foreign to Congress at he time. Although
one of the clearest examples of a nonbinding international agreement is the
Final Act of the Helsinki Conference in 1975, other historically famous
agreements include the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and the Potomac Charter of
1954.135
Additionally, the Case Act was the second introduction of this demand
for information, coming some 20 years after the first bill was introduced by
Senators Ferguson and Knowland.' The Congressmembers were motivated to
provide a check on the President's exercise of power, if necessary.' The
133 See International Executive Agreements Hearing, supra note 21, at 16.
134 Id.
135 See also ARNOLD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 6 (1961) ("[I]t would be a mistake to
assume that every agreement between States which adopts the form and language of a treaty
creates or is intended to create international legal obligations and is therefore strictly entitled to
be classified as a treaty. Frequently heads of States or duly empowered ministers concur in
making declarations of policy which they regard as morally and politically binding but which do
not create legal obligations between their States.").
136 Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on
Foreign Relations, 92nd Cong. 1 (1971) (statement of Sen. J.W. Fulbright, Chairman, S. Comm.
on Foreign Relations). The legislative history of the Case Act does also address some technical
changes that emanated from the failure of the previous bill, S. 3067 of the 83rd Congress. For
example, the previous bill required a 30-day notice, which would be mechanically difficult for
the Department of State. Id. at 11 (citing Letter from Thurston Morton, Assistant Sec'y for the
Sec'y of States to Hon. Alexander Wiley, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations (March 16,
1954)).
137 Senator Case's statement included the following:
To the extent that knowledge of their terms would have provided an
independent legislative check upon the obligations assumed by the executive
branch in our gradual involvement in Southeast Asia, the U.S. role in this war
might have been moderated or at least have been better understood in the
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Chairman went so far as to chastise Senators from a previous era for abdicating
their responsibilities to the nation38:
Since that time, through costly experience, we have discovered
that the President does not always know best, and that, indeed,
the country would be far better off today if Congress had been
more assertive in the exercise of its constitutional role, a role
which consists at least as much in assertion and criticism as it
does in subservience.139
What are we to make of the fact that political commitments have not
been reported to Congress under the Case Act? Does this indicate that political
commitments were never intended to be reported? Does it, at a minimum,
indicate that Congress has acquiesced to the Executive's understanding of the
Act as excluding political commitments? My response is twofold: first, it must
be noted that the very next political commitment of "international significance"
after the Case Act was enacted would be the Final Act of the Helsinki
Conference, which was in fact widely published and disseminated.140
Furthermore, Congress, as already discussed, acted upon the information
available to it in the Helsinki Accord and immediately established the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe to monitor compliance.14 1
If there is an established executive practice of not reporting political
agreements to Congress, it did not begin immediately after this bill became law.
Secondly, the secrecy of the agreements themselves is precisely what Congress
sought to remedy with the Case Act. It cannot therefore be penalized for not
objecting to the publication of further secret agreements. Put more succinctly,
"Constitutional custom requires that Congress must acquiesce to the president's
acts of which it has actual knowledge."1 42
Congress. Had this legislation been passed in 1956, the phrase 'credibility
gap' might never have entered the language.
Id. at 6.
138 "At that time all but a few Senators were caught up in what we must now recognize as the
shortsighted cult of presidential predominance in foreign policy." Id. at 2.
' Id. at 3.
1'4 The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) appears
in both International Legal Materials and in the Department ofState Bulletin. See Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1292 (1975);
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Final Act, 73 DEP'T ST. BULL. 323 (1975).
141 Act of June 3, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-304, 90 Stat. 661. The text of the Helsinki Accord was
published on September 1, 1975 and the bill that resulted in Public Law 94-304 was introduced
into the Senate on November 17, 1975. S. 2679, 94th Cong. (1975).
142 Hollis & Newcomer, supra note 6, at 568.
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B. The Case Act Does Not Require Modification, the Code ofFederal
Regulations Does
Although there is no law that governs political commitments, there is a
governing standard that relates to international agreements. At a minimum,
someone in Treaty Affairs at the U.S. Department of State makes a
determination regarding whether an agreement constitutes an "international
agreement" and requires reporting to Congress. 143 The Department of State has
compiled internal guidelines for determining the elements of a legally binding
international agreement.14 4 The gist of these guidelines is as follows: 1) the
parties to an agreement must intend to be bound under international aw; 2) the
agreement must be of international significance and not deal with trivial
matters; 3) the obligations undertaken must be clearly specified and be
objectively enforceable; 4) the agreement must have two or more parties; and
5) the agreement will preferably use a customary form.145
Nonetheless, the executive branch conducts this review without any
participation from Congress. More importantly, it created its own standards of
review. The Case Act does not specify "[d]ocuments intended to have political
or moral weight, but not intended to be legally binding, are not international
agreements"; this is language from the Code of Federal Regulations.146 The
Case Act is a reporting requirement for the executive branch, but the C.F.R.
provisions were actually drafted to help the Executive comply with
constitutional requirements that result from various international agreement
forms. Specifically these standards used to ensure compliance originated from a
procedure known as the Circular 175, which actually pre-existed the Case Act,
and were created to ensure that "the making of treaties and other international
agreements for the United States is carried out within constitutional and other
appropriate limits."1 4 7 While the criteria used by of the Office of Treaty Affairs
143 22 C.F.R. § 181.3 (2015).
Whether any undertaking, document, or set of documents constitutes or
would constitute an international agreement within the meaning of the Act or
of 1 U.S.C. 112a shall be determined by the Legal Adviser of the Department
of State, a Deputy Legal Adviser, or in most cases the Assistant Legal
Adviser for Treaty Affairs. Such determinations shall be made either on a
case-by-case basis, or on periodic consultation, as appropriate.
Id.
144 Circular 175, supra note 93 (codified at 22 C.F.R. § 181.4 (2015)).
145 22 C.F.R. § 181.2 (2015).
146 Id.
147 Circular 175, supra note 93 (codified at 22 C.F.R. § 181.4 (2015)). The standards used to
identify the procedure for creating international agreements have been in place since 1953 and
appear in their codified version in the Foreign Affairs Manual Objective 1 from FAM. 11
FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL 720, https://fam.state.gov/FAM/IlIFAMIIFAMO720.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2016). Circular 175 clearly originates as an administrative internal document,
with the purpose of having appropriate persons authorizing various documents and negotiations.
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are the same criteria generally used for determining the binding force of
agreements under international law, it does not follow that these must be the
standards used for determining whether an agreement is passed along to
Congress. For Congress, the issues regarding agreement forms and whether
they are legally binding are less -relevant than the significance of the
arrangement, as we saw in the Gore example.14 8 There is no constitutional
reason why Congress could not require reports on political commitments
irrespective of whether they constitute legal obligations.14 9 There is no reason
why, textually, the Case Act should not apply to political commitments, which
would require modification of the C.F.R. provisions, not of the U.S. Code. The
language regarding "international significance," as I argue, provides a useful
mechanism by which political commitments can be identified and transmitted
to Congress without the deluge of information that it so clearly wanted to avoid
during the deliberation of the Case Act in 197 1. s0
What do we make of the fact the political commitments have been
explicitly excluded from the C.F.R. provisions? Does it, at a minimum, indicate
that Congress has acquiesced to the Executive's understanding of the term
"international agreement"? The proposed regulations received no comments on
proposed sections 181.1 or 181.2 after being published in the Federal
Register."' Furthermore, Congress has had over 30 years to object to the
It outlines procedures for transmission and the preparation of copies for certification. It could be
argued that all international agreements contemplated by the Circular refer to congressional-
executive agreements or sole executive agreements, but that is also simply because no
constitutional limit law applies to the formation of political commitments, and therefore no
internal procedure was necessary for their lawful creation or execution. The 1955 version and
1969 version, which are what Case Act deliberators would have seen, are both available in
Congressional Oversight ofExecutive Agreements: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Separation
ofPowers of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong. 289, 303 (1972).
148 The criteria specify, in part,
[m]inor or trivial undertakings, even if couched in legal language and form,
are not considered international agreements within the meaning of the Act or
of 1 U.S.C. 112a. In deciding what level of significance must be reached
before a particular arrangement becomes an international agreement, the
entire context of the transaction and the expectations and intent of the parties
must be taken into account.
22 C.F.R. § 181.2 (2015).
149 Schachter, supra note 10, at 302 (suggesting that it "would not be unreasonable to do so in
the light of the significance accorded to such agreements in international relations").
150 The natural objection to this requirement will be that most agreements will go, and should
go, unnoticed. Hathaway, supra note 47, at 163, also notes "congressional staff complained that
reports were filed so late that they had 'to rely on contacts and leaks in the executive branch to
find out when really important negotiations are underway."'
1 Coordination and Reporting of International Agreements, 45 Fed. Reg. 75687 (Nov. 17,
1980); see also Coordination and Reporting of International Agreements, 46 Fed. Reg. 35917-02
(July 13, 1981) ("There were several comments from interested government agencies, and after
consultations, certain amendments to the proposed rules were made. The most important change
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regulations and the State Department's interpretation. The best response to this
powerful argument is that political commitments have received little public
attention, including from academics. The Hollis and Newcomer article, so
heavily relied upon in this piece, was not published until 2009, nearly 30 years
after the C.F.R.'s promulgation. Secondly, only recently has the reliance upon
these nonlegal understandings increased and has the political commitment
become interchangeable with the congressional-executive agreement.
V. CONCLUSION
Unlike treaties and congressional-executive agreements, which require
consultation and agreement by at least one party of Congress and the President,
the executive branch exercises its own prerogative to negotiate, conclude, and
observe political commitments without any congressional participation.
Moreover, unlike sole executive agreements, the authority for which is
ostensibly grounded in the text of the Constitution, there is no such implicit
authority for the Executive to conclude political agreements solely on his own
volition. The absence of interbranch cooperation is inconsistent with the
principle of separation of powers on which our government relies: a single
branch of government, even the one entrusted with the greatest scope of foreign
affairs duties, should not be able to act unilaterally.
More troubling still is the complete absence of a responsibility of the
Executive to even report to Congress the creation or conclusion of a political
commitment. The secrecy of political commitments is so unbalanced in favor of
the Executive that it excludes congressional participation entirely. By acting
clandestinely, regardless of intent, the President offers Congress no opportunity
to act, comment, or investigate whether the political commitment exceeded the
President's province of authority, including instances when a political
commitment violates a lawfully enacted piece of domestic legislation. Unless
the executive branch chooses to report the agreements, no documentation will
be made available. The current process and lack of oversight leads to the same
challenges that exist with regard to any executive agreement. This need not be
so because the provisions of the Case Act can apply equally to political
agreements as they do with congressional-executive agreements. The same
rationale that led to the creation of the Case Act to restore "a proper working
relationship between Congress and the executive branch in the field of foreign
affairs" applies to political commitments."s2
is the addition of language at § 181.4(d) providing that if unusual circumstances prevent an
agency from consulting with the Department of State on a proposed agreement at least 50 days
prior to the anticipated date for concluding such agreement, the agency is to use its best efforts to
consult as early as possible prior to the conclusion of the agreement.").
152 H.R. REP. No. 92-1301 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3067, 3068.
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Transparency and access to information are vital to a well-balanced,
functioning democracy. The Case Act's mere requirement of notice and
transmittal to Congress has had a positive effect of rebalancing the power of
international law making because it has made the Executive accountable for the
international agreements it makes. It also gives Congress the opportunity and
foundation to provide whatever check or demand on the Executive's exercise of
authority that it decides is appropriate. As I have illustrated, political
commitments are currently being used interchangeably with treaties and
congressional-executive agreements. Before the realm of political commitments
grows even larger, I would simply advise Congress to declare that the Case
Act, without modification, applies equally to political commitments of
"international significance" as it does to legally binding international
agreements.

